AN UPDATE OVERVIEW OF
SARS RESEARCHES IN TAIWAN
June 1st, 2004
Ministry
of Health and National Science Council, TAIWAN
1.
SARS
Outbreak, Taiwan, 2003, Emerging Infectious Diseases, 2004; 10(2): 201-206
Ying-Hen
Hsieh,* Cathy W.S. Chen,† and Sze-Bi Hsu‡
*National Chung Hsing University, Taichung, Taiwan
†Feng Chia University, Taichung, Taiwan
‡National Tsing Hua University, Hsinchu,
Taiwan
We studied the severe acute
respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreak in Taiwan, using the daily case-reporting
data from May 5 to June 4 to learn how it had spread so rapidly. Our results
indicate that most SARS-infected persons had symptoms and were admitted before
their infections were reclassified as probable cases. This finding could
indicate efficient admission, slow reclassification process, or both. The high
percentage of nosocomial infections in Taiwan suggests that infection from
hospitalized patients with suspected, but not yet classified, cases is a major
factor in the spread of disease. Delays in reclassification also contributed to
the problem. Because accurate diagnostic testing for SARS is currently lacking,
intervention measures aimed at more efficient diagnosis, isolation of suspected
SARS patients, and reclassification procedures could greatly reduce the number
of infections in future outbreaks.
2.
Re:
Mathematical Modeling of SARS: Cautious in All Our Movements, Journal
of Epidemiology and Community Health, (18 November 2003)
Ying-Hen
Hsieh,* and Cathy W.S. Chen†
*National
Chung Hsing University, Taichung, Taiwan
†Feng
Chia University, Taichung, Taiwan
Dear Editor
Dr
Nishiura [1] accentuated that caution must be exercised in using mathematical
models to ascertain the recent SARS epidemics.
The
key issue, as we believe, is to understand the model and its results for what
they are and, more importantly, for what they are not. It is especially true
with the basic reproductive number R0, or its variant the effective reproductive
number at time t Rt, which has been estimated for the recent SARS outbreaks in
Beijing, Hong Kong,, Toronto, Taiwan, and Singapore in several recent articles
(e.g. [2-6]). R0, the average number of secondary infections caused by an
infective person upon entering a totally susceptible population, is a useful
tool to gauge the initial trend of an epidemic. It is also often misunderstood
and misused. Indeed, a recent news feature in Nature [7] described the basic
reproductive number R0 as "A measure of a disease's infectiousness"
corresponds to how many people, on average, are infected by each patient in the
absence of any control measures, which erroneously left out the important
requirement that the patient must be an index case in that population, i.e. all
possible contacts of that person are susceptible to infection.
The
effective reproductive number at time t Rt =R0 x(t), where x is the susceptible
proportion of population at time t, measures number of infections caused by a
new case at time t.[3] It is more important as a mean to understand the
progression of the epidemic, taking into consideration the control measures,
behavior changes, and climate as they have all been proven to be important in
the case of SARS. Moreover, one can approximate the average growth rate of an
epidemic over a given time interval while the epidemic is underway from the
cumulative case data. From which one could then estimate the "mean
effective reproductive number of the observed time period" R*, i.e. the
average number of secondary infections caused by one infective person during the
observed time interval. The precise definition gives the public officials a
clear chronology of progression (or cessation) of the epidemic, albeit
retrospectively.
For
illustration, we used the cumulative number of probable SARS cases in Taiwan by
onset date from March 12 to June 15,[8] exponential curve fitting with
first-order autocorrelation in the error structure,[9] and the period of SARS
infectivity of 29.03 days (i.e. time from onset to death or discharge) estimated
from [10] to obtain the mean effective reproductive numbers for the five
distinct periods during March 12 - June 15 (Table
1). A chronology of relevant events of importance is given as a footnote of Table
1. Figure 1 paints a clear picture of slowly growing epidemic in the
beginning, to the outbreak kindled by the admission of first SARS patient to Ho
Ping Hospital, the site of first hospital cluster infections, on April 9. The
peak period of infections (4/11-4/26) ended with the shutdown of Ho Ping
Hospital on April 24. The series of hospital clusters in Taipei and subsequently
in the southern port city of Kaohsiung finally subsided with the May 11 shutdown
of Chang Gung Hospital in Kaohsiung, due to successful intervention efforts to
stop nosocomial infections, the last of which occurred shortly before June 9 the
onset date of the last hospital infection in Taiwan. The result clearly points
to the important lesson from the outbreak in Taiwan shutdown of hospitals where
cluster infections have occurred had been a crucial step in breaking the local
chains of transmissions. The effect of quarantine measures, however, is less
clear and requires further study, perhaps with mathematical modeling. Clearly,
retrospective mathematical modeling is an important reference for public health
policy makers intending to contain possible future outbreaks with the most
effective intervention measures as long as we understand them for what they are
and what they are not.
Table 1 Mean
effective reproductive numbers R* for each of the five time periods with events
of relevance during the time periods
|
|
Mean |
SD |
95%Lower CI |
95% Upper CI |
|
3/12 - 4/10 |
2.24692 |
0.27770 |
1.72717 |
2.40090 |
|
4/11 - 4/26 |
3.48070 |
0.42094 |
2.62280 |
4.15280 |
|
4/27 - 5/12 |
1.42828 |
0.05934 |
1.57454 |
1.78713 |
|
5/13 - 5/27 |
0.27770 |
0.02900 |
0.58469 |
0.76811 |
|
5/28 - 6/15 |
0.08410 |
0.00958 |
0.07083 |
0.10498 |
3/18 ?
Implementation of Level A quarantine.
4/09 ? Admission of first SARS patient to Ho Ping Hospital.
4/24 ? Shutdown of Ho Ping Hospital.
4/28 ? Implementation of Level B quarantine.
5/11 ? Shutdown of Chang Gung Hospital.
6/15 ? Onset date of the last hospital infection.
References:
(1) Nishiura H.
Mathematical modeling of SARS: cautious in all our movements. J Epidem Com
Health 2003; In Press.
(2) Riley S, Fraser
C, Donnelly C, Ghani AC, Abu-Raddad LJ, Hedley AJ, et al. Transmission dynamics
of the etiological agents of SARS in Hong Kong: Impact of public health
interventions. Science 2003; 300: 961-66 (20 June 2003) Published online 23 May
2003 (10.1126/science.1086478)
(3) Lipsitch, M,
Cohen T, Cooper B, Robins JM, Ma S, James L, et al. Transmission dynamics and
control of severe acute respiratory syndrome. Science 2003; 300: 1966-70 (20
June 2003) Published online 23 May 2003; 10.1126/science.1086616
(4) Zhou G, &
Yan G. Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome epidemics in Asia. Emerg Infect Dis
2003; 9(12), In Press.
(5) Hsieh YH, Chen
CWS, & Hsu SB. The Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome outbreak in Taiwan:
Lessons to be learned. Emerg Infect Dis 2003; To Appear.
(6) Chowell G,
Fenimore PW, Castillo-Garsow MA, & Castillo-Chavez C. SARS outbreaks in
Ontario, Hong Kong, and Singapore: the role of diagnosis and isolation as a
control mechanism. J Theoret Biol 2003; 224: 1-8.
(7) Pearson H,
Clarke T, Abbott A, Knight J, & Cyranoski D. SARS: what have we learned?
Nature 2003; 424(6945):121-6. Nature 424, 121: 126(2003) (10 July 2003).
(8) Center for
Disease Control (Taiwan). Available at http://www.cdc.gov.tw/sarsen
(9) Hsieh YH,. &
Chen CWS. Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome: Numbers don’t tell the whole
story. British Medical J 2003; 326: 1395-1396.
(10) Donnelly C,
Ghani AC, Leung GM, Hedley AJ, Fraser c, Riley S, et al. Epidemiological
determinants of spread of causal agent of severe acute respiratory syndrome in
Hong Kong. Lancet 2003; 361(9371): 1761-66. (May 24 2003) Available at http://image.thelancet.com/extras/-3art4453web.pdf.
3.
Ying-Hen
Hsieh
National
Chung Hsing University, Taichung 402, Taiwan
TO
THE EDITOR:
Your editorial (May 15 issue)1 describes the
speed and power of the Internet in communicating to the world knowledge about
severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) and the progression of the epidemic.
This access is indispensable to those of us in Taiwan, from government officials
to basic researchers like me. Because of Taiwan’s
exclusion from the World Health Organization (WHO),2 we had to rely
solely on the Internet to obtain information about SARS from the WHO’s Web site and other Web sites like that of the Journal, until a team of epidemiologists from the WHO finally
arrived in May to assess the damage here. Inexperienced at containing an
outbreak, Taiwan was ill prepared for the task, and the deficiencies in hospital
management and the health system were exposed. Since late April, a series of
clusters of infections in hospitals made Taiwan’s “the most rapidly growing outbreak,”
3 although the pace
slowed after mid-May (Fig. 1). It was said that no single entity can manage SARS
on its own. 4 For a while, Taiwan was asked by the world to do just
that.
References:
1. Drazen JM, Campion EW. SARS, the Internet, and the Journal.
N Engl J Med 2003;348:2029.
2. Hsieh YH. Politics hindering SARS work. Nature
2003;423:381.
3. Update 59 — report on Guangxi (China)
visit, situation in Taiwan, risk of SARS transmission during air travel. Geneva:
World Health Organization, May 2003. (Accessed July 24, 2003, at http://
www.who.int/csr/sars/archive/2003_05_19/en/.)
4. Update 58 — first global consultation on
SARS epidemiology, travel recommendations for Hebei Province (China), situation
in Singapore. Geneva: World Health Organization, May 2003. (Accessed July 24,
2003, at http://www.who.int/csr/sars/archive/
2003_05_17/en/.)

DRS. DRAZEN AND CAMPION REPLY:
It is
essential that we learn from the worldwide experience in containing the
outbreaks of SARS. This coronavirusassociated infection could reemerge as a
threat to world health. The global threat required consistent responses,
regardless of all our differences. The Internet facilitated rapid, global
communication of information about outbreaks and the containment procedures,
which were basically the same in every country. One lesson to remember is that
with an infectious disease such as SARS, the welfare of all depends on early
detection of the disease and open, honest communication among health officials
everywhere.
Jeffrey M. Drazen, M.D.
Edward W. Campion, M.D.
4.
On SARS Epidemiology, Cumulative Case Curve, and
Logistic-Type Model: Ascertaining Effectiveness of Intervention and Predicting
Case Number, Emerging Infectious Diseases (in press)
Ying-Hen Hsieh,* Jen-Yu Lee,* and Hsiao-Ling Chang#
*Department of Applied Mathematics, National Chung Hsing
University, Taichung, Taiwan
#Center for Disease Control, Department of Health, Taipei, Taiwan
To
the Editor: The quantitative assessment of the effectiveness of public health
intervention measures during the recent SARS pandemic presents a difficult
challenge for modelers of infectious disease epidemiology (1-4). Zhou and Yan
(5) used Richards model, a logistic-type model, to fit the cumulative number of
SARS cases reported daily in Singapore, Hong Kong and Beijing, all with very
encouraging result. However, the key to making use of mathematical models for
SARS epidemiology is to understand the models for what they are and what they
are not (6). There are two issues that one must address regarding the modeling
in (5). First, they described the function F(S)
in the model as measuring “the effectiveness of intervention measures”.
It is important to know that the parameters in F(S),
namely the maximum cases load K and
the exponent of deviation a, depict
the actual progression of the epidemic as described by the data used. In other
words, they merely quantify the end
results of whatever intervention measures that had actually been implemented
during the outbreaks. Simply put, they do not shed any light on the
all-important question of “what if”. Unfortunately, to gauge the
effectiveness of intervention measures, one would need to consider a more
complicated model with variable maximum case load and growth rate (r) to highlight the time-varying nature of an epidemic and its
dependence on the intervention measures that had been implemented during the
epidemic.
The
second issue involves the more subtle, but nonetheless important, question of
how cumulative case numbers can be most appropriately used in infectious disease
epidemiology. Attempt to predict future trend of an epidemic from limited data
during early stages of the epidemic is indeed futile and sometimes misleading
[7]. Paradoxically, early prediction of the magnitude of an epidemic outbreak is
immeasurably more important than retrospective studies. The question then is:
how early is too early? It is intuitive that cumulative case curve will always
exhibit S-shape curve, well-described by a logistic-type model. The essential
factor one needs to consider is the time when the inflection of the cumulative
case curve occurs, i.e. the moment when rapid increase in case number is
replaced by slow increase. Since the inflection point, denoted by tm
in (5), dictates the point in time when the rate of increase of cumulative
case number reaches its maximum, the moment marks the key turning point when the
spread of the disease starts to alleviate. As long as the data one uses include
this infection point and a time interval shortly after, the curve fitting and
the prediction of future case number will not be far from accurate.
To
illustrate our point more precisely, we make use of the cumulative SARS case
data by onset date in Taiwan obtained from the SARS databank of CDC, Taiwan. The
data cover the time period from February 25, 2003, the onset date of first
confirmed SARS case, to June 15, 2003, the onset date of last confirmed case,
for a total of 346 confirmed SARS cases during the 2003 outbreak in Taiwan [8].
We fit the cumulative case data to the cumulative case function S(t)
in Richards model with the initial time t0=0
being February 25 and the initial case number S0=S(0)=1.
Description of the model, as well as the result of the parameter estimation, is
given in the Appendix. The estimates for the parameters are r=0.136
(95% C.I.: 0.121-0.150), K=343.4 (95%
C.I.: 339.7-347.1), a=1.07 (95% C.I.:
0.80-1.35), and the infection point at tm=66.62 (95%C.I.: 63.9-69.3) with
adjusted r2>0.998, p<0.0001 for the goodness-of-fit of the model (Figure
1). The result indicates that the infection occurred on May 3 and the estimate
for the maximum case number K=343.3 is
merely 0.8% off the actual total case number.
Moreover,
the case number data used is by onset date. Given a mean SARS incubation period
of 5 days (4-6 days in [9]), we could backtrack the infection point for SARS infections
in Taiwan to five days before May 3, namely on April 28. It is worthwhile to
note that on April 26, the first SARS casualty in Taiwan past away, amid public
shock and panic. Starting April 28, the government implemented a series of
strict intervention measures, including household quarantine of all travellers
from affected areas [10]. In retrospect, April 28 was indeed the turning point
of the SARS outbreak in Taiwan.
To
address the important question of making projections during an ongoing epidemic,
we use the same data set but for various time intervals all starting from
February 25 but truncated at various dates around the inflection point of May 3.
The resulting parameter estimates are given in Table 1 of the Appendix. For the
truncated data ending on April 28 before the inflection occurred, we obtain a
completely unreasonable estimate of K=875.8.
However, if we use the data ending on May 5, May 10, May 15, and May 20,
respectively, we obtain the respective estimates of K=204.9, 253.1, 334.2, and 342.1. The estimate clearly improves as
we move further past the inflection time of May 3 (Figure 2). Moreover, the last
estimate, using data from February 25-May 20 only, produces a mere 1.1% error
from the eventual cumulative case number of 346, with 95% C.I. of 321.5-362.6.
This retrospective exercise clearly demonstrates that if the cumulative case
data used for predictive purpose during an outbreak contains information on the
inflection point and about a fortnight after that, the estimate for the total
case number can be obtained with excellent accuracy, well before the date of the
last reported case. This procedure offers immense possibilities for future
public health policy purposes. However, although in our example the estimate for
the inflection point became very acceptable rather quickly once the data used
for the estimation procedure contains that inflection point (Table 1), the
difficult task of how one can correctly determine the true inflection point
during a real ongoing epidemic still calls for careful scrutiny and judicious
use of the model - as one shall with all mathematical epidemic models.
References:
1.
Lipsitch M, Cohen T, Cooper B, Robins JM, Ma S, James L, et al. Transmission
dynamics and control of severe acute respiratory syndrome. Science 2003;300:1966–70.
2.
Riley S, Fraser C, Donnelly CA, Ghani AC, Abu-Raddad LJ, Hedley AJ, et al. Transmission
dynamics of the etiological agent of SARS in Hong Kong: impact of public health
interventions. Science
2003;300:1961–6.
3.
Dye C, Gay N. Modeling the SARS epidemic. Science 2003; 300: 1884-85 (20 June
2003).
4.
Hsieh YH, Chen CWS, & Hsu SB. SARS outbreak, Taiwan 2003. Emerg
Infect Dis 2004; To appear.
5. Zhou G, Yan G. Severe acute respiratory
syndrome epidemic in Asia. Emerg Infect Dis 2003; Dec 9(12). Available from:
URL: http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol9no12/03-0382.htm
6.
Ying-Hen Hsieh, Cathy W.S. Chen. Re: Mathematical modeling of SARS: Cautious in
all our movements. J Epidem Com Health, 2003; (published online November 18,
2003). Available at http://jech.bmjjournals.com/cgi/eletters/57/6/DC1#66.
7.
Razum O, Becher H, Kapaun A, Junghanss T. SARS, lay
epidemiology, and fear. Lancet 2003;361:1739–40.
8.
World Health Organization. Summary of probable SARS cases with onset of illness
from 1 November 2002 to 31 July 2003 (revised 26 September 2003). Available at
http://www.who.int/csr/sars/country/table2003_09_23/en/.
9. World Health Organization. Consensus document on the
epidemiology of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS). October 17, 2003.
Available at http://www.who.int/csr/sars/en/WHOconsensus.pdf.
10.
Lee ML, Chen CJ, Su IJ, Chen KT, Yeh CC, King CC, et al. Use of quarantine to
prevent transmission of severe acute respiratory syndrome--Taiwan, 2003. MMWR
Morb. Mortal Wkly Rep. 2003 Jul 25;52(29):680-3.
5.
Control Measures for Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS)
in Taiwan, Emerging Infectious Diseases, 2003; 9(6): 718-720
hiing-Jer Twu,* Tzay-Jinn Chen,* Chien-Jen
Chen,*1 Sonja J. Olsen,† Long-Teng Lee,* Tamara Fisk,†‡
wo-Hsiung Hsu,* Shan-Chwen Chang,*§ Kow-Tong Chen,* I-Hsin Chiang,* Yi-Chun
Wu,* Jiunn-Shyan Wu,* and Scott F. Dowell†
As of April 14, 2003, Taiwan had had 23
probable cases of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), 19 of which were
imported. Taiwan isolated all 23 patients in negative-pressure rooms; extensive
personal protective equipment was used for healthcare workers and visitors. For
the first 6 weeks of the SARS outbreak, recognized spread was limited to one
healthcare worker and three household contacts.
6.
Antigenicity and Receptor-Binding Ability of Recombinant SARS Coronavirus
Spike Protein
Biochemical
and Biophysical Research Communications, 2004; 313(4): 938-947
Tin-Yun Ho,a
Shih-Lu Wu,b Shin-Ei Cheng,c Yen-Chiao Wei,c
Shan-Ping Huang,b and Chien-Yun Hsiangc*
a Institute of Chinese Medical Science, China Medical University, Taichung,
Taiwan
b Department of Biochemistry, China Medical University, Taichung, Taiwan
c Department of Microbiology, China Medical University, Taichung, Taiwan
Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) is an emerging
infectious disease associated with a novel coronavirus and causing worldwide
outbreaks. SARS coronavirus (SARS-CoV) is an enveloped RNA virus, which contains
several structural proteins. Among these proteins, spike (S) protein is
responsible for binding to specific cellular receptors and is a major antigenic
determinant, which induces neutralizing antibody. In order to analyze the
antigenicity and receptor-binding ability of SARS-CoV S protein, we expressed
the S protein in Escherichia coli using
a pET expression vector. After the isopropyl-β-D-thiogalactoside induction, S protein was expressed in the soluble form
and was purified by nickel-affinity chromatography to homogeneity. The amount of
S protein recovered was 0.2 to 0.3 mg per 100 ml bacterial culture. The S
protein was recognized by sera from SARS patients by ELISA and Western blot,
indicated that recombinant S protein remained its antigenicity. By biotinylated
ELISA and Western blot using biotin- labeled S protein as the probe, we
identified 130-kDa and 140-kDa proteins in Vero cells might be the cellular
receptors responsible for SARS-CoV infection. Taken together, these results
suggested that recombinant S protein exhibited the antigenicity and
receptor-binding ability, and it could be a good candidate for further
developing SARS vaccine and anti-SARS therapy.
Keywords: SARS; Coronavirus; Spike; Expression; Antigenicity;
Receptor binding
7.
Characterization of the SARS Coronavirus Protease Expressed in Escherichia
Coli, Biochemical
and Biophysical Research Communications (in press)
Cheng-Wen Lin,a*
Chang-Hai Tsai,b* Fuu-Jen Tsai,b Chien-Chen Lai,b
Hua-Hao Chiu,a Kuan-Hsun Lina and Pei-Jer Chenc
a Department of Medical
Laboratory Science and Biotechnology, China Medical University, Taichung 404,
Taiwan
b Department of Medical Genetics and Medical Research,
China Medical University, Hospital, Taichung, 404 Taiwan
cDepartment of Internal
Medicine, National Taiwan University College of Medicine,
National Taiwan University Hospital, Taipei 100, Taiwan.
Severe
acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) has been globally reported. A novel
coronavirus, SARS-coronavirus (SARS-CoV) was identified as the etiological agent
of the disease. SARS-CoV 3C-like protease (3CLpro) mediates the proteolytic
processing of replicase polypeptides 1a and 1ab into functional proteins,
playing an important role in viral replication. In this study, we demonstrated
the expression, purification, and functional characterization of the SARS-CoV
3CLpro in E. coli, and identified the cleavage site recognized by the SARS-CoV
3CLpro using the cis-acting
proteolytic assays. The identified cleavage site (Thr4426- Val4427- Arg4428-
Leu4429- Gln4430- Ala4431- Gly4432- Asn4433- Ala4434- Thr4435) locates within
the C-terminal non-structural protein 6 of SARS-CoV, containing a LQA motif
recognized by most other coronavirus proteases. Our results will be helpful for
developing cheap, rapid, and easy approaches for large-scale screening of the
SARS-CoV 3CLpro inhibitors.
8.
Characterization
of SARS Coronavirus Genomes in Taiwan: Molecular Epidemiology and Genome
Evolution, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of
America (in press)
Shiou-Hwei
Yeh,1,2 Hurng-Yi Wang,3 Ching-Yi Tsai,2 Chuan-Liang
Kao,4 Jyh-Yuan Yang,5 Hwan-Wun Liu,6 Ih-Jen Su,5
Shih-Feng Tsai,1 Ding-Shinn Chen,2,7,8 Pei-Jer Chen2,7,8
and the National Taiwan University SARS Research Team.
1Division of Molecular and Genomic Medicine,
National Health Research Institutes, Taiwan.
2Hepatitis Research Center, National Taiwan
University Hospital, Taipei, Taiwan.
3Institute
of Molecular Biology, Academia Sinica, Taiwan.
4Department of Medical Technology, National Taiwan
University, Taipei, Taiwan.
5Center
for Disease Control, Taipei, Taiwan.
6Institute
of Preventive Medicine, National Defense Medical College, Taiwan.
7Department of Internal Medicine, National Taiwan
University Hospital,
8Graduate Institute of Clinical Medicine, National
Taiwan University College of Medicine, Taipei, Taiwan.
Since
early March 2003, the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) coronavirus
infection has claimed 346 cases and 37 deaths in Taiwan. The epidemic occurred
in two stages. The first stage caused limited familial or hospital infections,
and lasted from early March to mid-April. All cases had clear contact histories,
primarily from Guangdong or Hong Kong. The second stage resulted in a large
outbreak in a municipal hospital, and quickly spread to northern and southern
Taiwan from late April to mid-June. During this stage, there were some sporadic
cases with untraceable contact histories. To investigate the origin and
transmission route of SARS-CoV in Taiwan’s epidemic, we conducted a systematic
viral lineage study by sequencing the entire viral genome from ten SARS
patients. SARS-CoV viruses isolated from Taiwan were found closely related to
those from Guangdong and Hong Kong. In addition, all cases from the second stage
belonged to the same lineage following the municipal hospital outbreak,
including the patients without an apparent contact history. Analyses of these
full-length sequences showed a positive selection occurring during SARS-CoV
virus evolution. The mismatch distribution indicated that SARS viral genomes did
not reach equilibrium and suggested a recent introduction of the viruses into
human populations. The estimated genome mutation rate was approximately 0.1 per
genome, demonstrating possibly one of the lowest rates among known RNA viruses.
9.
Microbiologic Characteristics, Serologic Responses, and Clinical
Manifestations in Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome, Taiwan1, Emerging Infectious Diseases, 2003; 9(9): 1163-1167
Po-Ren Hsueh,*
Cheng-Hsiang Hsiao,* Shiou-Hwei Yeh,† Wei-Kung Wang,* Pei-Jer Chen,*
Jin-Town Wang,* Shan-Chwen Chang,* Chuan-Liang Kao,* Pan-Chyr Yang,* and The
SARS Research Group of National Taiwan University College of Medicine and
National Taiwan University Hospital2
*National Taiwan
University Hospital, National Taiwan University College of Medicine, Taipei,
Taiwan
†National
Health Research Institute, Taipei, Taiwan
1The first and the
second author contributed equally to this paper.
2The SARS Research
Group of National Taiwan University College of Medicine and National Taiwan
University Hospital includes the following: Ding-Shinn Chen, Yuan-Teh Lee, Che-Ming
Teng, Pan- Chyr Yang, Hong-Nerng Ho, Pei-Jer Chen, Ming-Fu Chang, Jin- Town
Wang, Shan-Chwen Chang, Chuan-Liang Kao, Wei-Kung Wang, Cheng-Hsiang Hsiao, and
Po-Ren Hsueh.
The
genome of one Taiwanese severe acute respiratory syndrome-associated coronavirus
(SARS-CoV) strain (TW1) was 29,729 nt in length. Viral RNA may persist for some
time in patients who seroconvert, and some patients may lack an antibody
response (immunoglobulin G) to SARS-CoV >21 days after illness onset. An
upsurge of antibody response was associated with the aggravation of respiratory
failure.
10.
Detection
of Large Amount of SARS-Associated Coronavirus in Saliva and Throat Wash:
Implications for Transmission and Early Diagnosis, Journal of Infectious
Diseases (in press)
Wei-Kung
Wang,1,2 Shey-Ying Chen,3a I-Jung Liu,1a Yee-Chun
Chen,2 Jann-Tay Wang,2 Wang-Hwei Sheng,2
Chi-Tai Fang,2 Hui-Ling Chen,1 Chao-Fu Yang,1 Pei-Jer
Chen,2,4 Shiou-Hwei Yeh,5 Chuan-Liang Kao,6
Li-Min Huang,7 Po-Ren Hsueh,2 Chien-Ching Hung,2
Szu-Min Hsieh,2 Chan-Ping Su,3 Wen-Chu Chiang,3
Jyh-Yuan Yang,8 Jih-Hui Lin,8 Szu-Chia Hsieh,1
Hsien-Ping Hu,1 Yu-Ping Chiang,1 Jin-Town Wang,1
Pan-Chyr Yang,2 Shan-Chwen Chang,2 and members of the SARS
Research Group of the NTUCM/NTUH
1Institute of Microbiology, 4Clinical
Medicine, and 6Medical Technology, College of Medicine, National
Taiwan University, Taipei, Taiwan
2Department of Internal Medicine, 3Emergency
Medicine, and 7Pediatrics, National Taiwan University Hospital,
Taipei, Taiwan
5National Health Research Institute, Taipei, Taiwan
8Center for Disease Control, Department of Health,
Taipei, Taiwan
The
severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS)-associated coronavirus, SARS-CoV, is
known to be transmitted primarily through contact of and dispersal of droplets. Little
is known about the load of SARS-CoV in oral droplets.
In this study, we examined oral specimens including saliva and throat
wash, and reported that large amount of SARS-CoV RNA were found in both saliva
(7.08 X 103 to 6.38 X 108 copies /ml) and throat wash
(9.58 X 102 to 5.93 X 106 copies /ml) from all 14
consecutive probable SARS cases studied, providing a direct evidence of
transmission through oral droplets. Immunofluorescence
study revealed replication of SARS-CoV in the cells derived from throat wash,
demonstrating the first convenient antigen detection assay for SARS-CoV.
This finding together with the high detection rate at a median of 4.5
days after disease onset and before the development of lung lesion in 4 cases
suggest that saliva and throat wash be included in the current guidelines of
sample collection for SARS diagnosis.
Tae Woo Kim,1 Jin Hyup Lee,1 Chien-Fu Hung,1
Shiwen Peng,1 Richard Roden,1,2 Mei-Cheng Wang,3
Raphael Viscidi,4 Ya-Chea Tsai,1 Liangmei He,1
Pei-Jer Chen,5,6 David A. K. Boyd,1 and T.-C. Wu1,2,7,8*
Departments
of Pathology,1 Pediatrics,4 Oncology,7
Biostatistics,3 Obstetrics and Gynecology,2 Molecular
Microbiology and Immunology, The Johns Hopkins Medical Institutions, Baltimore,
Maryland 21205,8 Graduate Institute of Clinical Medicine,5
Hepatitis Research Center, National Taiwan University Hospital, College of
Medicine, National Taiwan University, Taipei, Taiwan6
Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) is a
serious threat to public health and the economy on a global scale.
The SARS coronavirus (SARS-CoV) has been identified as the
etiological agent for SARS. Thus, vaccination against SARS-CoV may
represent an effective approach to controlling SARS. DNA vaccines are
an attractive approach for SARS vaccine development, as they offer
many advantages over conventional vaccines, including stability,
simplicity, and safety. Our investigators have previously shown that
DNA vaccination with antigen linked to calreticulin (CRT)
dramatically enhances major histocompatibility complex class I
presentation of linked antigen to CD8+ T cells. In this study,
we have employed this CRT-based enhancement strategy to create
effective DNA vaccines using SARS-CoV nucleocapsid (N) protein as a
target antigen. Vaccination with naked CRT/N DNA generated the most
potent N-specific humoral and T-cell-mediated immune responses in
vaccinated C57BL/6 mice among all of the DNA constructs tested.
Furthermore, mice vaccinated with CRT/N DNA were capable of
significantly reducing the titer of challenging vaccinia virus
expressing the N protein of the SARS virus. These results show that a
DNA vaccine encoding CRT linked to a SARS-CoV antigen is capable of
generating strong N-specific humoral and cellular immunity and may
potentially be useful for control of infection with SARS-CoV.
12.
Patient data, early SARS
epidemic, Taiwan, Emerging
Infectious Diseases
2004; 10(3): 489-493
Hsueh PR, Chen PJ, Hsiao CH, Yeh SH, Cheng WC, Wang
JL, Chiang BL, Chang SC, Chang FY, Wong WW, Kao CL, Yang PC, SARS Research Group
of National Taiwan University College of Medicine and National Taiwan University
Hospital
National Taiwan University College of Medicine, No.
7 Chung-Shan South Road, Taipei, Taiwan.
Of the first 10 patients in
the epidemic of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in Taiwan, 4 were
closely associated with a SARS patient in an airplane. Loose stools or diarrhea,
hemophagocytosis syndrome, and high serum levels of interleukin (IL)-6, IL-8,
and tumor necrosis factor-a associated with lung lesions were found in all 10
patients.
13.
Assembly of Human Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) Coronavirus-like
Particles, Biochemical and Biophysical Research Communications
(accepted)
Yu Ho, Pi-Hsiu Lin, Catherine
Y. Y. Liu, Su-Ping Lee, and Yu-Chan Chao*
Institute of Molecular Biology, Academia Sinica, Nankang, Taipei 115,
Taiwan, ROC.
Viral particles of human severe acute respiratory syndrome
coronavirus (SARS-CoV) consist of three virion structural proteins, including
spike protein, membrane protein, and envelope protein. In this report,
virus-like particles were assembled in insect cells by the co-infection with
recombinant baculoviruses, which separately expressing one of these three virion
proteins. We found that the membrane and envelope proteins are sufficient for
the efficient formation of virus-like particles and could be visualized by
electron microscopy. Sucrose gradient purification ollowed by Western analysis
and immunogold labeling showed that the spike protein could be incorporated into
the virus like particle also. The construction of engineered virus-like
particles bear resemblance to the authentic one is an important step towarding
the development of an effective vaccine against infection of SARS CoV.
14.
SARS
Outbreak in Taiwan (Reply to Hsieh et al), Emerging Infectious Diseases
(in press)
Po-Ren
Hsueh* and Pan-Chyr Yang
*,ϯNational
Taiwan University Hospital, National Taiwan University College of Medicine,
Taipei, Taiwan.
Directors
of Case classification* and Clinical Managementϯ of SARS, the
SARS Prevention and Extrication Committee, Department of Health, Executive Yuan,
Taiwan, Republic of China.
In Reply to Hsieh et al:
The article by Hsieh et al. analyzed the daily case-report data for severe acute
respiratory syndrome (SARS) from May 5 to June 4 2003, which were posted on the
website of the Center for Disease Control of Taiwan, to show how this disease
had spread so rapidly in the 2003 outbreak (1). They suggested that infection
from hospitalized patients with suspected cases of SARS which had not yet
reclassified as probable cases was a major factor in the rapid spread of the
disease in hospitals. Slow reclassification and delayed placement of patients
with initially suspected cases in negative-pressure isolation rooms contributed
to the high percentage (73%) of nosocomial infection in Taiwan (1).
During the study period
(stage II) of the outbreak, there were three teams responsible for the
classification of SARS cases (2). The team members included infectious disease
specialists, chest physicians, and epidemiologists, recruited from major
teaching hospitals in the northern, middle, and southern parts of Taiwan, and
were organized by the Taiwan CDC and the National Health Insurance Bureau. They
met daily and reviewed the clinical data, travel and contact history, and chest
radiography of the reported cases obtained (via email or fax) from attending
physicians caring for the patients. The same protocol (Table) was used by all
members to classify the cases as suspected or probable. All hospitals that cared
for the suspected SARS patients either had their own committee to classify
patients according to World Health Organization (WHO) guidelines or followed the
above protocol for classification or reclassification of reported cases by the
team members (3).
Although official
reclassification might well have taken the twelve and a half days suggested by
Hsieh et al, the conclusion that inadequate isolation of patients during this
period led to significant nosocomial transmission cannot be based upon the data
available to these authors. From the first day that suspected cases were
reported to the Taiwan CDC, patients were placed in negative-pressure isolation
rooms whenever available. While suspected cases may have been less likely than
probable cases to be placed in negative-pressure isolation rooms where these
were in short supply, all other available isolation precautions were used to
care for suspect case patients while they were undergoing reclassification. The
notion that significant transmission occurred despite these isolation
precautions is not consistent with the literature suggesting the central role of
gloves, gowns, and surgical masks in preventing transmission (4). Thus the
process of reclassification was not associated with the timing of isolation
measures shown to have the greatest impact in preventing transmission.
The high proportion of
patients with nosocomial SARS infection in Taiwan is consistent with the
observations of Lingappa et al (5) and others who have noted that the hospital
setting was the primary amplifier of SARS transmission with significant
community transmission occurring in only the largest of outbreaks. The high
proportion of nosocomial cases suggests that containment measures instituted in
Taiwan were ultimately successful in preventing a much larger outbreak. Multiple
factors were associated with the nosocomial outbreaks in Taiwan including
inadequate infection control infrastructure and triage screening leading to
delayed detection of several highly contagious index cases.
References:
1.
Hsieh YH, Chen CWS, Hsu SB. SARS outbreak, Taiwan,
2003. Emerg Infect Dis 2004;10:201-6.
2.
Center for Disease Control, Department of Health,
Executive Yuan, Taiwan: Memoir of severe acute respiratory syndrome control in
Taiwan. 2003. Available from: URL: http://www.cdc.gov.tw
3.
World Health Organization. Case definition for
surveillance of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS). Geneva: 1 May 2003.
Available from: URL: http://www.who.int/csr/sars/casedefinition/en.
4.
Loeb M, McGeer A, Henry B, Ofner M, Rose D, Hlywka
T, et al. SARS among critical care nurses, Toronto. Emerg Infect Dis
2004;10:251-5.
5.
Lingappa JR, McDonald LC, Simone P, Parashar UD.
Wresting SARS from uncertainty. Emerg Infect Dis 2004;10:167-70.
15.
Rhabdomyolysis Associated With Probable SARS, American
Journal of Medicine, 2003; 115(5): 421-422
Jiun-Ling
Wang, Jann-Tay Wang, Chong-Jen Yu, Yee-Chun Chen, Po-Ren Hsueh, Cheng-Hsiang
Hsiao, Chuan-Liang Kao, Shan-Chwen Chang, Pan-Chyr Yang
National
Taiwan University Hospital, Taipei, Taiwan
To the Editor:
Severe
acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) is an emerging disease that was first
recognized in November 2002 (1). Previous studies have pointed out that patients
with probable SARS may have abnormal laboratory examination results, including
elevated creatine kinase levels (2–4). We report 3 patients with probable SARS
who developed rhabdomyolysis.
The first
patient was a 38-year-old woman who suffered from probable SARS during a
nosocomial outbreak in Taiwan (5). She developed fever and chills on April 20,
2003. Her chest radiograph showed bilateral pneumonic patches. Because SARS was
suspected, she was admitted to our hospital on April 28. She was intubated and
given midazolam and succinylcholine for respiratory failure. Fever of up to 39°C
was noted on the same day. Repeat blood, urine, and sputum cultures did not
yield any pathogens. Vero cells from a throat swab yielded a coronavirus. SARS-associated
coronavirus infection was confirmed by detection of coronavirus ribonucleic acid
by real-time reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction tests from sputum.
Serum creatine kinase level increased from 21 to 13,834 U/L from May 2 to 3,
while serum creatinine level increased to 3.27 mg/dL. By May 6, serum creatine
kinase level had increased to a peak value of 339,750 U/L, even after hydration
and alkalization, while serum myoglobin level had increased to 167 ng/mL
(normal, _70 ng/mL). Rhabdomyolysis was diagnosed clinically. Acute renal
failure developed on May 4 and the patient went into a deep coma. She died 3
weeks later due to secondary bacterial infection despite mechanical ventilatory
support, hemodialysis, and antibiotic treatment. A skeletal muscle biopsy
specimen showed necrotic muscle fibers, basophilic change of sarcoplasm,
enlarged vesicular nuclei, and centrally located nuclei.
The
second patient was a 2-yearold-man who suffered from probable SARS during a
nosocomial outbreak at the same hospital (5). He started to have fever and
chills since April 21, with myalgia and headache. A dry cough developed since
April 24 and a chest radiograph revealed a pneumonia patch over the right lower
lung field. Acute respiratory distress syndrome and hypotension developed on
April 26. Initial microbiologic workup that included blood, urine, and sputum
cultures was negative, except for Vero cells from a throat swab, sputum, and
stool that were positive for coronavirus. Indirect fluorescent antibody to SARS-associated
coronavirus was also positive. Serum creatine kinase level increased from 378 to
7659 U/L from April 24 to 30, and renal failure developed. Serum myoglobin level
on May 7 was 989 ng/mL. The patient died on May 15 because of multiple organ
failure. No autopsy was performed.
The third
patient was a 42-year-old woman who suffered from SARS since May 10. The
diagnosis was based on fever, pneumonia, and a history of caring for a SARS
patient. All of the microbiological studies for pathogens in community-acquired
pneumonia were negative, except for detection of antibody to SARS coronavirus by
indirect fluorescent antibody assay. SARS-associated coronavirus from the sputum
was also detected by real-time reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction.
Respiratory failure developed on May 21. Serum creatine kinase level increased
from 364 to 9050 U/L from June 2 to 4. Serum myoglobin level was also elevated
at 2136 ng/mL on June 6. A muscle biopsy specimen showed degeneration of muscle
fibers with vacuolization of sarcoplasm and empty sarcolemmal tubes. After
aggressive hydration and urine alkalization, the creatine kinase level decreased
to within normal range, and the patient was taken off treatment successfully.
Rhabdomyolysis
has been associated with many infectious diseases, including viral infections
such as in-fluenza (6). In the 3 patients with probable SARS who developed
rhabdomyolysis during their disease course, succinylcholine-related malignant
hyperthermia might have been another possible etiology in the first patient (7),
whereas no other predisposing factors of rhabdomyolysis, such as toxins, drugs,
electrolytes, or infectious agents, were found in the other 2 patients. Serum
creatine kinase cardiac isoenzymes were less than 5% of the creatine kinase
level in all 3 patients.
Elevated
serum creatine kinase levels of up to 3000 U/L have been noted in previous
patients with SARS. However, an extremely high serum level with positive serum
myoglobin, which leads to acute renal failure, has not been reported (2–4). We
conclude that rhabdomyolysis-associated renal failure may be another unusual but
severe presentation of SARS. Patients with SARS should have their creatine
kinase levels monitored carefully, even if initial levels are only slightly
elevated.
1. World Health Organisation.
SARS epidemiology to date. Available at: http:// www.who. int/csr/sars/epi2003_04_11/en/.
Accessed April 11, 2003.
2. Lee N, Hui D, Wu A, et al.
Major outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome in Hong Kong. N
Engl J Med. 2003; 348: 1986–1994.
3. Peiris JSM, Chu CM, Cheng
VCC, et al. Clinical progression and viral load in a community outbreak of
coronavirus-associated SARS pneumonia: a prospective study. Lancet.
2003; 361: 1767–1772.
4. Booth CM, Matukas LM,
Tomlinson GA, et al. Clinical features and short-term outcomes of 144 patients
with SARS in the greater Toronto area. JAMA.
2003; 289: 2801–2809.
5. Lee ML, Chen CJ, Su IJ, et
al. Severe acute respiratory syndrome—Taiwan, 2003. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep. 2003; 52: 461–466.
6. Singh U, Scheld WM.
Infectious etiologies of rhabdomyolysis: three case reports and review. Clin
Infect Dis. 1996; 22: 642–649.
7. Gabow PA, Kaehny WD,
Kelleher SP. The spectrum of rhabdomyolysis. Medicine.
1982; 61: 141–152.
16.
Severe
Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) - An Emerging Infection of the 21st Century,
Journal of the Formosan Medical Association, 2003; 102(12): 825-839
Hsueh
PR and Yang PC
Department of
Laboratory Medicine and Internal Medicine, National Taiwan University Hospital,
National Taiwan University College of Medicine, Taipei, Taiwan.
Severe acute respiratory
syndrome (SARS) is an emerging infection caused by a novel coronavirus known as
SARS-CoV. The disease has a high propensity to spread to household members and
healthcare workers and may be associated with transmission and outbreaks in the
community. Severe illness in immunocompromised patients, sophisticated hospital
facilities and treatment procedures, particularly those that generate aerosols,
and lack of adequate isolation and control measures, can amplify transmission
and contribute to so-called "super-spreading" events. The presence of
non-specific clinical manifestations at presentation and a lack of validated
early diagnostic methods and effective management pose great difficulty for
frontline physicians in the containment of this disease. The mortality of SARS
is in the region of 10 to 15%; the presence of underlying disease, high initial
C-reactive protein levels, and positive SARS-CoV in nasopharyngeal aspirate
samples are associated with a higher risk of respiratory failure and mortality.
Despite the disappearance of SARS cases worldwide, the potential evolution of
SARS-CoV in animals suggests the disease may re-emerge in the future. Heightened
levels of clinical suspicion, rapid case detection and isolation, and contact
tracing are essential to effective management of future outbreaks. Further
ongoing requirements for successful management include research on the
immunopathogenesis of SARS and the development of timely and reliable diagnostic
tests, effective antiviral and immunomodulatory agents, and vaccines for the
disease.
17.
Clinical
Manifestations, Laboratory Findings, and Treatment Outcomes of SARS Patients, Emerging
Infectious Diseases
2004; 10(5): 818-24.
Jann-Tay Wang,*
Wang-Huei Sheng,* Chi-Tai Fang,* Yee-Chun Chen,* Jiun-Ling Wang,* Chong-Jen Yu,*
Shan-Chwen Chang,* and Pan-Chyr Yang*
Clinical and laboratory data on severe acute
respiratory syndrome (SARS), particularly on the temporal progression of
abnormal laboratory findings, are limited. We conducted a prospective study on
the clinical, radiologic, and hematologic findings of SARS patients with
pneumonia, who were admitted to National Taiwan University Hospital from March 8
to June 15, 2003. Fever was the most frequent initial symptom, followed by
cough, myalgia, dyspnea, and diarrhea. Twenty-four patients had various
underlying diseases. Most patients had elevated C-reactive protein (CRP) levels
and lymphopenia. Other common abnormal laboratory findings included leukopenia,
thrombocytopenia, and elevated levels of aminotransferase, lactate dehydrogenase,
and creatine kinase. These clinical and laboratory findings were exacerbated in
most patients during the second week of disease. The overall case-fatality rate
was 19.7%. By multivariate analysis, underlying disease and initial CRP level
were predictive of death.
18.
Infection
Control and SARS Transmission among Healthcare Workers, Taiwan, Emerging
Infectious Diseases
2004; 10(5): 895-8.
Yee-Chun Chen,* Pei-Jer Chen,* Shan-Chwen
Chang,* Chiang-Lian Kao,* Shiou-Hwa Wang,* Li-Hua Wang,* Pan-Chyr Yang,* and the
SARS Research Group of National Taiwan University College of Medicine and
National Taiwan University Hospital
This study found infrequent transmission of
severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) coronavirus to healthcare workers
involved in the care of the first five casepatients in Taiwan, despite a
substantial number of unprotected exposures. Nonetheless, given that SARS has
been highly transmissible on some occasions, we still recommend strict
precautions.
19.
SARS Exposure and Emergency
Department Workers, Emerging
Infectious Diseases, http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol10no6/03-0972.htm
Wei-Tien
Chang,* Chuan-Liang Kao,* Ming-Yi Chung,* Shyr-Chyr Chen,* Shou-Ju Lin,* Wen-Chu
Chiang,* Shey-Ying Chen,* Chan-Ping Su,* Po-Ren Hsueh,* Wen-Jone Chen,* Pei-Jer
Chen,* and Pan-Chyr Yang*
*National
Taiwan University Hospital and College of Medicine, Taipei, Taiwan
Of 193 emergency
department workers exposed to severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), 9 (4.7%)
were infected. Pneumonia developed in six workers, and assays showed anti-SARS
immunoglobulin (Ig) M and IgG. The other three workers were IgM-positive and had
lower IgG titers; in two, mild illness developed, and one remained asymptomatic.
20.
Su CP, Chiang WC, Ma MH, Chen SY, Hsu CY, Ko PC,
Tsai KC, Fan CM, Shih FY, Chen SC, Chen YC, Chang SC, Chen WJ.
In a pilot sudy conducted
during March 14 to April 2, 2003, 2 severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS)
screening scores were developed for predicting SARS among febrile patients
presenting to the emergency department (ED). The objective of this study is to
validate these scoring systems with a different set of patients. METHODS: All
adult patients with documented fever, measured at home or at the hospital, and
presenting to the ED of National Taiwan University Hospital, a 2,400-bed
tertiary care teaching hospital in northern Taiwan, were prospectively enrolled.
Two previously developed SARS screening scores were applied to all patients. The
final diagnosis of SARS was made by the Expert Committee of the Center for
Disease Control Taiwan, Republic of China, according to the criteria of Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA. RESULTS: A total of 239 adult
patients, including 117 men and 122 women, were enrolled. Eighty-two patients
were finally diagnosed with SARS. Compared with the SARS patients in the
derivation cohort, those in the validation cohort were older (44.5+/-15.9 versus
33.9+/-15.9 years), more likely to acquire the disease locally (76.8% versus
37.5%), and more likely to have cough before or during fever. For the non-SARS
patients, cases in the validation cohort presented with less cough and coryza
but more diarrhea. For the 4-item symptom score, the sensitivity reached 96.3%
(95% confidence interval [CI] 89.7% to 98.7%) and the specificity 51.6% (95% CI
43.8% to 59.3%). For the 6-item clinical score, the sensitivity reached 92.6%
(95% CI 84.8% to 96.6%) and the specificity 71.2% (95% CI 63.6% to 77.7%). When
the clinical score was applied to patients with a positive symptom score, the
combined sensitivity reached 90.2% (95% CI 82.0% to 95.0%), and the combined
specificity reached 80.1% (95% CI 73.2% to 85.6%). CONCLUSION: This prospective
study validated the scoring system previously developed by using a different
cohort. The scoring systems could be applied to settings where mass screening of
SARS is needed during future outbreaks.
21.
Severe
Acute Respiratory Syndrome, Current Opinion in Infectious Diseases, 2004;
17(2): 143-148
Wang JT and Chang SC
Division of
Infectious Diseases, Department of Internal Medicine, National Taiwan University
Hospital, Taipei, Taiwan.
PURPOSE OF REVIEW: Severe acute respiratory
syndrome (SARS) is an infectious disease first recognized in November 2002 in
Guangdong Province, China. It spread to many countries all over the world during
February to June 2003, with 8098 cases reported. Twenty-one percent of the
affected people were health care workers. Because SARS is a new emerging
disease, this review describes the current understanding about the etiology,
clinical pictures, laboratory and radiological findings of SARS. RECENT
FINDINGS: Severe acute respiratory syndrome-associated coronavirus (SARS-CoV)
was quickly found to be the etiological agent of SARS in April 2003. The
transmission of SARS-CoV between human beings is mainly due to close contact.
Using barrier precautions, the transmission of SARS-CoV can be prevented. The
most common clinical presentations of patients with SARS include fever, cough,
and dyspnea. The common laboratory findings include lymphopenia,
thrombocytopenia, elevated serum alanine and aspartate aminotransferase, lactate
dehydrogenase, creatine phosphokinase, and C-reactive protein. The most common
radiological finding is pneumonic lesion(s) in the chest radiogram. Many
patients experience exacerbation of clinical symptoms in the second week of
disease course and some may progress to respiratory failure and need mechanical
ventilatory support. The overall case fatality rate is 9.6%. The current method
of treatment of SARS is still controversial. SUMMARY: SARS is an infectious
disease with high contagiousness and a high mortality rate. Early case
identification and infection control are two important factors to limit its
spread.
22.
Clinical
and Laboratory Features of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
vis-à-vis Onset of Fever, Chest (in press)
Division of Chest
Medicine, Department of Internal Medicine, Mackay Memorial Hospital, Taipei,
Taiwan.
*Department
of Medical Research, Mackay Memorial Hospital, Taipei, Taiwan.
Severe acute respiratory
syndrome (SARS) is a rapid progressive disease caused by a novel coronavirus (SARS-CoV)
infection. However, the disease presentation is non-specific. The aim of this
study was to define clearly the presentation, clinical progression, and
laboratory data in a group of patients who had SARS.
23.
SARS
in Hospital Emergency Room, Emerging Infectious Diseases,
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol10no5/03-0579.htm
Yee-Chun Chen,* Li-Min Huang,* Chang-Chuan Chan,*
Chan-Ping Su,* Shan-Chwen Chang,* Ying-Ying Chang,* Mei-Ling Chen,* Chien-Ching
Hung,* Wen-Jone Chen,* Fang-Yue Lin,* Yuan-Teh Lee,* and the SARS Research Group
of National Taiwan University College of Medicine and National Taiwan University
Hospital
*National
Taiwan University Hospital, National Taiwan University College of Medicine,
Taipei, Taiwan
Thirty-one cases of
severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) occurred after exposure in the
emergency room at the National Taiwan University Hospital. The index patient was
linked to an outbreak at a nearby municipal hospital. Three clusters were
identified over a 3-week period. The first cluster (5 patients) and the second
cluster (14 patients) occurred among patients, family members, and nursing aids.
The third cluster (12 patients) occurred exclusively among healthcare workers.
Six healthcare workers had close contact with SARS patients. Six others, with
different working patterns, indicated that they did not have contact with a SARS
patient. Environmental surveys found 9 of 119 samples of inanimate objects to be
positive for SARS coronavirus RNA. These observations indicate that although
transmission by direct contact with known SARS patients was responsible for most
cases, environmental contamination with the SARS coronavirus may have lead to
infection among healthcare workers without documented contact with known
hospitalized SARS patients.
24.
Altered p38 Mitogen-Activated
Protein Kinase Expression in Different Leukocytes with Increment of
Immunosuppressive Mediators in Patients with Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS)
1, Immunology (in press)
Chen-Hsiang Lee,*
Rong-Fu Chen,2+ Jieh-Wei Liu,* Wen-Tien Yeh,+
Jen-Chieh Chang,+ Po-Mai Liu,+ Hock-Liew Eng,# Meng-Chih Lin,* and Kuender D. Yang3+
From the Departments
of Internal Medicine*, Medical Research+, and Clinical Pathology#, Chang Gung Memorial Hospital at Kaohsiung 833,
Taiwan.
1
This study was in part supported by grants CMRP
8045 and CMRPG 82010S from Chang Gung Memorial Hospital; and a grant SIMM09-05
from National Science Council, Taiwan.
2 Rong-Fu Chen and Chen-Hsiang Lee contributed
equally to this work.
3Address correspondence and reprint requests to Dr.
Kuender D. Yang, Department of Medical Research (12F12L), Children Hospital
Building, Chang Gung Memorial Hospital at Kaohsiung, 123 Ta-Pei Road, Niau-Sung,
Kaohsiung 833, Taiwan. E-mail address: yangkd@adm.cgmh.org.tw.
Severe
acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) has spread to a global pandemic, especially in
Asia. The transmission route of SARS has been clarified, but the
immunopathogenesis of SARS is unclear. In an age-matched case-control design, we
studied immune parameters in 15 SARS patients who were previously healthy.
Plasma was harvested for detection of virus load, cytokines and nitrite/nitrate
(NOx) levels, and blood leukocytes were subjected to flow cytometric analysis of
intracellular mitogen-activated protein kinases (MAPKs) in different leukocytes.
Patients with SARS had significant higher IL-8 levels ( p=0.016) in early stage
and higher IL-2 levels (p= 0.039) in late stage than normal controls. Blood TNFa
, IL-6, and IL-10, and NOx levels were not significantly elevated. In contrast,
TGFb and PGE2 levels were significantly elevated in SARS patients.
Five of the 15 SARS patients had detectable coronaviruses in blood, but patients
with detectable and undetectable viremia had no different profiles of immune
mediators. Flow cytometric analysis of MAPKs activation by phospho-p38 and
phospho-p44/42 (ERK) expression showed that augmented p38 activation (p=0.044)
of CD14 monocytes associated with suppressed p38 activation (p=0.033) of CD8
lymphocytes was found in SARS patients. These results suggest that regulation of
TGFb and PGE2 production and MAPKs activation in different leukocytes
may be considered while developing therapeutics for the SARS treatment.
25.
Antibody Detection of SARS-CoV Spike and Nucleocapsid
Protein, Biochemical
and Biophysical Research Communications, 2004; 314(4): 931-936
Mau-Sun Chang a,b,1 Yen-Ta Lu,a,c,1
Shin-Tsung Ho,d Chao-Chih Wu,a Tsai-Yin Wei,a
Chia-Ju Chen,a Yun-Ting Hsu,a Po-Chen Chu,a
Ching-Hsin Chen,a Jien-Ming Chu,a Ya-Lin Jan,a
Chia-Chien Hung,d Chi-Chen Fan,e and Yuh-Cheng Yanga
c,f,*
a Department of Medical Research, Mackay Memorial Hospital, Taipei, Taiwan,
ROC
b National Taipei University of Technology, Taipei, Taiwan, ROC
c Taipei Medical University, Taipei, Taiwan, ROC
d Department of Laboratory Medicine, Mackay Memorial Hospital, Taipei,
Taiwan, ROC
e Department of Pathology, Mackay Memorial Hospital,
Taipei, Taiwan, ROC
f Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology, Mackay Memorial Hospital, Taipei,
Taiwan, ROC
Early detection and identi.cation of SARS-CoV-infected
patients and actions to prevent transmission are absolutely critical to prevent
another SARS outbreak. Antibodies that speci.cally recognize the SARS-CoV spike
and nucleocapsid proteins may provide a rapid screening method to allow accurate
identi.cation and isolation of patients with the virus early in their infection.
For this reason, we raised peptide-induced polyclonal antibodies against
SARS-CoV spike protein and polyclonal antibodies against SARSCoV nucleocapsid
protein using 6_ His nucleocapsid recombinant protein. Western blot analysis and
immuno.uorescent staining showed that these antibodies speci.cally recognized
SARS-CoV.
26.
Inhibition
of SARS-CoV Replication by Niclosamide, Antimicrobial
Agents and Chemotheraphy (in press)
Chang-Jer Wu,1,*
Jia-Tsrong Jan,1,* Chi-Min Chen,2 Hsing-Pang Hsieh,3
Der-Ren Hwang,3 Hwan-Wun Liu,1 Chiu-Yi Liu,1
Hui-Wen Huang,1 Su-Chin Chen,1 Cheng-Fong Hong,1
Ren Kuo Lin,3 Yu-Sheng Chao,3 John T.A. Hsu3
1Institute of Preventive Medicine, National Defense
Medical College, National Defense University, Taipei, Taiwan
2Animal Technology Institute Taiwan, Miaoli, Taiwan
3Division of Biotechnology and Pharmaceutical
Research, National Health Research Institutes, Taipei, Taiwan
Antiviral
agents are urgently needed to fight against Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS).
We showed that niclosamide, an existing antihelminthic drug, was able to inhibit
replication of SARS-CoV; viral antigen synthesis was totally abolished at 1.56 mM.
Thus, niclosamide represents a promising drug candidate for effective treatment
of SARS-CoV infection.
27.
Epidemiology
and Control of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) Outbreak in Taiwan, The
New Global Threat: Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome and Its Impacts, p. 301
Chien-Jen
Chen; Yin-Chu Chien; Hwai-I Yang
Graduate
Institute of Epidemiology, College of Public Health, National Taiwan University,
1 Jen-Ai Road Section 1, Taipei 10018, TAIWAN
correspondence
to: Professor Chien-Jen
Chen cjchen@ha.mc.ntu.edu.tw
28.
Early Detection of Antibodies against Various Structural
Proteins of the SARS-Associated Coronavirus in SARS Patients, Journal of
Biomedical Science, 2004; 11:117-126
Ho-Sheng Wu,a-c Yueh-Chun Hsieh,c Ih-Jen
Su,b Ting-Hsiang Lin,b Shu-Chun Chiu,b Yu-Fen
Hsu,b Jih-Hui Lin,b Mei-Ching Wang,b Jeou-Yuan
Chen,d Pei-Wen Hsiao,e Geen-Dong Chang,f Andrew
H.-J. Wan,c Hsien-Wei Ting,c Chih-Ming Chou,g
Chang-Jen Huangc
aGraduate Institute of Life
Sciences, National Defense Medical Center, bDivision of Laboratory
Research and Development, Center for Disease Control, Department of Health,
Institutes of cBiological Chemistry, dBiomedical Sciences,
and eBioAgricultural Sciences, Academia Sinica, fGraduate
Institute of Biochemical Sciences, National Taiwan University, and gDepartment
of Biochemistry, Taipei Medical University, Taipei, Taiwan, ROC.
Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), a new disease
with symptoms similar to those of atypical pneumonia, raised a global alert in
March 2003. Because of its relatively high transmissibility and mortality upon
infection, probable SARS patients were quarantined and treated with special and
intensive care. Therefore, instant and accurate laboratory confirmation of SARS-associated
coronavirus (SARS-CoV) infection has become a worldwide interest. For this need,
we purified recombinant proteins including the nucleocapsid (N), envelope (E),
membrane (M), and truncated forms of the spike protein (S1-S7) of SARS-CoV in Escherichia
coli. The six proteins N, E, M, S2, S5, and S6 were used for Western
blotting (WB) to detect various immunoglobulin classes in 90 serum samples from
54 probable SARS patients. The results indicated that N was recognized in most
of the sera. In some cases, S6 could be recognized as early as 2 or 3 days after
illness onset, while S5 was recognized at a later stage. Furthermore, the result
of recombinant-protein-based WB showed a 90% agreement with that of the
whole-virus-based immunofluorescence assay. Combining WB with existing RT-PCR,
the laboratory confirmation for SARS-CoV infection was greatly enhanced by
24.1%, from 48.1% (RT-PCR alone) to 72.2%. Finally, our results show that IgA
antibodies against SARS-CoV can be detected within 1 week after illness onset in
a few SARS patients.
29.
Serologic
and Molecular Biologic Methods for SARS-associated Coronavirus Infection,
Taiwan, Emerging Infectious Diseases, 2004;
10:304-310.
Ho-Sheng Wu, Shu-Chun Chiu, Tsan-Chang Tseng, Szu-Fong
Lin, Jih-Hui Lin, Yu-Fen Hsu, Mei-Ching Wang, Tsuey-Li Lin, Wen-Zieh Yang, Tian-Lin
Ferng, Kai-Hung Huang, Li-Ching Hsu, Li-Li Lee, Jyh-Yuan Yang, Hour-Young Chen,
Shun-Pi Su, Shih-Yan Yang, Ting-Hsiang Lin, and Ih-Jen Su
Center for Disease Control, Department of Health, Taiwan,
Republic of China
Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) has raised a
global alert since March 2003. After its causative agent, SARS-associated
coronavirus (SARS-CoV), was confirmed, laboratory methods, including virus
isolation, reverse transcriptase–polymerase chain reaction (RTPCR), and
serologic methods, have been quickly developed. In this study, we evaluated four
serologic tests (neutralization test, enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay [ELISA],
immunofluorescent assay [IFA], and immunochromatographic test [ICT]) for
detecting antibodies to SARS CoV in sera of 537 probable SARS case-patients with
correlation to the RT-PCR . With the neutralization test as a reference method,
the sensitivity, specificity, positive predictive value, and negative predictive
value were 98.2%, 98.7%, 98.7%, and 98.4% for ELISA; 99.1%, 87.8%, 88.1% and
99.1% for IFA; 33.6%, 98.2%, 95.7%, and 56.1% for ICT, respectively. We also
compared the recombinantbased western blot with the whole virus–based IFA and
ELISA; the data showed a high correlation between these methods, with an overall
agreement of >90%. Our results provide a systematic analysis of serologic and
molecular methods for evaluating SARS-CoV infection.
30.
Transmission
of the severe acute respiratory syndrome on aircraft, New England Journal
ofMedicine,
2003; 349(25): 2416-2422.
Olsen
SJ, Chang HL, Cheung TY, Tang AF, Fisk TL, Ooi SP, Kuo HW, Jiang DD, Chen KT,
Lando J, Hsu KH, Chen TJ, Dowell SF.
The severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) spread
rapidly around the world, largely because persons infected with the SARS-associated
coronavirus (SARS-CoV) traveled on aircraft to distant cities. Although many
infected persons traveled on commercial aircraft, the risk, if any, of in-flight
transmission is unknown. METHODS: We
attempted to interview passengers and crew members at least 10 days after they
had taken one of three flights that transported a patient or patients with SARS.
All index patients met the criteria of the World Health Organization for a
probable case of SARS, and index or secondary cases were confirmed to be
positive for SARS-CoV on reverse-transcriptase polymerase chain reaction or
serologic testing. RESULTS: After one
flight carrying a symptomatic person and 119 other persons, laboratory-confirmed
SARS developed in 16 persons, 2 others were given diagnoses of probable SARS,
and 4 were reported to have SARS but could not be interviewed. Among the 22
persons with illness, the mean time from the flight to the onset of symptoms was
four days (range, two to eight), and there were no recognized exposures to
patients with SARS before or after the flight. Illness in passengers was related
to the physical proximity to the index patient, with illness reported in 8 of
the 23 persons who were seated in the three rows in front of the index patient,
as compared with 10 of the 88 persons who were seated elsewhere (relative risk,
3.1; 95 percent confidence interval, 1.4 to 6.9). In contrast, another flight
carrying four symptomatic persons resulted in transmission to at most one other
person, and no illness was documented in passengers on the flight that carried a
person who had presymptomatic SARS. CONCLUSIONS:
Transmission of SARS may occur on an aircraft when infected persons fly during
the symptomatic phase of illness. Measures to reduce the risk of transmission
are warranted. Copyright 2003 Massachusetts Medical Society
31.
Sensitive
and Quantitative Detection of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus
Infection by Real-Time Nested Polymerase Chain Reaction, Clinical
Infectious Diseases, 2004; 38(2): 293-296.
Shih Sheng Jiang,1 Tsan-Chi Chen,1
Jyh-Yuan Yang,3 Chao A. Hsiung,2 Ih-Jen Su,3
Ying-Lan Liu,1 Po-Cheng Chen1 and Jyh-Lyh Juang1
Divisions of 1Molecular and Genomic Medicine
and 2Biostatistics and Bioinformatics, National Health Research
Institutes, and 3Division of Laboratory Research and Development,
Center for Disease Control, Department of Health, Taipei, Taiwan
A quantitative, real-time, nested polymerase chain
reaction (PCR) method, combining the high sensitivity of nested PCR with
time-saving real-time instrumentation, was developed for large-scale screening
for severe acute coronavirus (SARS) coronavirus. Forty-six clinical specimens
were analyzed by this method, and results were compared with those obtained by
conventional, single-round, real-time reverse-transcriptase PCR (RT-PCR)
performed in parallel. Of the 17 positive results, 2 identified by our method
were not detected by single-round, real-time RT-PCR, which suggests that
realtime nested PCR has the potential for increased sensitivity, leading to
earlier detection of SARS.
32.
Potential Role for
the Environment in the Transmission of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome in a
Hospital Emergency Room, Emerging Infectious Diseases (accepted)
Y. C. Chen, L. M. Huang, C. C. Chan*, C. P. Su, S. C.
Chang, Y. Y. Chang, M. L. Chen, W. C. Chen, F. Y. Lin and Y. T. Lee
Thirty
one cases of severe acute respiratory syndrome(SARS) occurred following exposure
to Emergency Room of National Taiwan University Hospital. The index case was
linked to an outbreak at a nearby municipal hospital. Three clusters were
identified over a three-week period. The first cluster (5 cases) and the second
cluster (14 cases) occurred among patients. Family members and nursing aids, and
the third cluster (12 cases) occurred exclusively among healthcare workers. Six
of the healthcare workers had close contact with SARS patients. Six others, with
different working patterns, denied SARS contact. Environmental surveys found 9
of 119 samples of inanimate objects to be positive for SARS coronavirus RNA.
These observations indicate that although transmission by direct contact with
known SARS cases was responsible for most cases, it is possible that
environmental contamination with the SARS cornoavirus may have lead to infection
among healthcare workers without a documented contact with known
hospitalized SRAS patients.